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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK RIGGLE and GENEVA 
H. RIGGLE, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
DAINES MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10948 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiffs sued on a promissory note, and in 
defense the Defendant pleaded usury, failure of 
consideration and denied the amount of attorneys' 
fees to be allowed, if any. (R. 1 & 35-36) 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court, the Honorable D. Frank Wil-
kins, Judge, pursuant to a motion by Plaintiffs, 
granted summary judgement as prayed against the 
Defendant on the promissory note, together with 
attorney's fees and costs. (R. 26, 45) 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant and Appellant here in seeks a re-
versal of the summary judgment and a directive 
that the trial court hear the appellant's defense of 
usury, failure of consideration and amount of attol'-
neys' fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a smnmary judgment. 
The defenses of usury and want of consideration 
to the promissory note pleaded by the Defendant 
were not tried. Judgment was awarded on Plain-
tiffs' pleadings and Pla~ntiffs' affidavit. The De-
fendant by its pleadings and affidavit placed in 
issue its defenses of usury and want of considera-
tion as aforesaid ( R. 18-21). 
On June 8, 1954, the Defendant's predecessor, 
a partnership consisting of R. M. Daines, R. D. 
Daines and J. Norman Daines, borrowed $10,000.00 ' 
from the Plaintiffs, for which the partnership gave 
a promissory note of $10,000.00, with interest at 
the rate of six per cent per annum. As additional 
consideration for the loan, the makers of said pro-
missory note executed an employment contract with 
the Plaintiff Frank Riggle, under the terms of 
which Frank Riggle was employed for a period of 
five years at an annual compensation of $1,800.00. 
Thereafter the partnership organized the defendant 
corporation as the partnership's successor, and it 
was substituted as a party under the employment 
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conti·act. The note herein sued on was for payments 
due under the employment contract (R. 18-21, 47). 
Prior to the incorporation of the defendant on 
January 18, 1955, said R. D. Daines, R. M. Daines 
and J. Norman Daines had been engaged in the 
manufacture and sale of store appliances at Logan, 
Utah. They were the incorporators of the Defendant 
corporation ( R. 18-21). The Plaintiff Frank Riggle 
was engaged in Ogden, Utah, in the business of 
sharpening saws under the name of Overnight Saw 
Service ( R. 18-21). 
The Plaintiffs in support of their motion for 
summary judgment filed an affidavit (R. 11-17). 
The Defendant filed a counter-affidavit ( R. 18-21). 
Plaintiffs' affidavit included the employment con-
tract dated July 1, 1955 between Plaintiff Frank 
Riggle and the Defendant, which among other 
things, set forth that for a period of four years De-
fendant would pay him for his services as a business 
and enginee::0 ing consultant the sum of $150.00 per 
month, with additional compensation of $50.00 per 
clay for such time in excess of three days per month 
that he spent at Defendant's place of business in 
Logan, Utah (R. 11-17). Also, Plaintiffs' affidavit 
set forth as Exhibit "C" employment receipts from 
Daines Manufacturing Company covering the per-
iod of September 1, 1954 to October 31, 1956 (R. 
14-15). Plaintiffs alleged that on August 1, 1959, 
the Defendant was delinquent in its payments in 
the amount of $1,050.00 and that the note sued on 
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was given in payment of the delinquency, with a 
further agreement that if the note was paid prompt-
ly, he, Frank Riggle, would waive any future s~l­
ary claim under the contract (R. 11, 12). 
Prior to the Defendant's incorporation, one of 
the partners, R. M. Daines, took saws to the Plain-
tiff for sharpening. During the conversation he 
told Plaintiff Frank Riggle that Defendant was 
going to incorporate their business to enable them 
to sell stock to obtain additional capital. The Plain-
tiff Frank Riggle replied that he had some money 
to invest and invited R. M. Daines to dis2uss the 
matter with him later. Several meetings were held 
and in the month of June, 1954, when all of thi: 
three partners were present, the Plaintiff Frank 
Riggle told them that he had decided he did not 
want to buy stock of the corporation being formed; 
that he was only interested in a sure thing and an 
investment that would return to him more than the 
legal rate of interest, and if a satisfadory arrange-
ment could be worked out by which he could double 
his money, he would be willing to lend the corpora-
tion $10,000.00 ( R. 18-20). 
The affidavit also sets forth: 
"* * * The Plaintiff Frank Riggle sug-
gested that a note for the $10,000.00, with 
interest at six per cent, could be signed and, 
in addition, the corporation would employ the 
Plaintiff Frank Riggle to sweep the floor 
once or twice a year; that this way Plaintiff 
Frank Riggle could double his money by the 
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time the note was paid off, if the corporation 
paid him a salary of $1,800.00 a year for a 
period of five years. 
. "That pursuant to said arrangement, the 
said note was executed and signed by the 
three officers, and a written con tract of em-
ployment was entered into by and between 
the Plaintiff Frank Riggle and the three of-
ficers, still doing business as a partnership, 
which employment contract has been lost; 
that at the time of this meeting it was agreed 
that both the note and the employment con-
tract would be('.ome obligations of the corpor-
ation when the corporate organization was 
completed, and that payments of interest on 
th'3 note and payments under the employment 
contract were made by the defendant corpor-
ation and the officers as a partnership, and 
accepted by the Plaintiff Frank Riggle prior 
to incorporation, and after incorporation; 
that subsequently Defendant corporation was 
incorporated under the laws of the State of 
Utah, and a certificate of incorporation was 
issued on the 18th day of January, 1955. 
That after incorporation a new contract of 
employment was entered into by and between 
the Plaintiff Frank Riggle and the Defen-
dant corporation covering the same terms 
and conditions as that entered into between 
the Plaintiff Frank Riggle and the three of-
ficers of the corpora ti on prior to incorpora-
tion; that the Plaintiff Frank Riggle sug-
gested that the employment contract recite 
that the Plaintiff Frank Riggle was to fur-
nish business and engineering consultation as 
a way of justifying his employment; th~t the 
Plaintiff Frank Riggle, as aforement10ned, 
was engaged in the saw sharpening business 
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in Ogden, Utah, and that the defendant cor-
voration place of business was at Logan, 
Utah, and that at no time has the Plaintiff 
performed any service under the employment 
contract. That the Plaintiff Frank Riggle 
doing business as Overnight Saw Service, dicl 
sharpen saws for the Denfandants, for which 
he was paid separately and apart from the 
employment contract. That independent of 
the money paid by the defendant corpm'ation 
and the partnership prior to incorporation, 
paid the Plaintiff Frank Riggle the sum of 
$9,612.58. That a promissory note in the sum 
of $1,050.00, which is the subject of this ac-
tion, was delivered to the Plaintiff Frank 
Riggle for back salary under the aforemen-
tioned employment contract, which sum is in-
cluded in the $9,612.58 above. 
''That the Plantiff Frank Riggle has 
never performed any service of the defendant 
corporation except the sharpening of saws, as 
aforementioned, and the exe'.:ution of said 
employment contract was rne1'ely a devlse to 
evade the usury Jaws of the State of Utah 
and to provide Plaintiff Frank Riggle ·with 
a greater rate of interest than legally allow-
ed." (R. 18-21) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
PL A I N T I F F S' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. DEFENDANT RAISED MATER-
IAL ISSUES OF FACT - USURY AND FAIL-
URE OF CONSIDERATION, WHICH CAN 
ONLY BE DETERMINED BY A TRIAL. 
The law is plain that a summary judgment 
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should not be granted if there is any genuine issue 
tu be tried. The Court made Findings of Fact which 
necessitated weighing the conflicting allegations of 
the two affidavits. Such findings were made al-
though no evidence has ever been received upon 
these conflicting allegations (R. 46-48, R. 11-17, R. 
18-21). 
As stated in Young vs. Felornia, (Utah) 244 
P. 2d 862, 121 Utah 646: 
"In respect to a summary judgment, 
Rule 56 ( c) U.R.C.P. provides: 'The judg-
ment sought shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no g·enuine issue as to any ma-
terial fact, and that the moving party is en-
titled to a judgment, as a matter of law.' 
"Under this rule, it is clear that if there 
is any genuine issue as to any material fact, 
the motion should be denied." 
Not only is this the rule, but it is also the rule 
that every inference fairly arising from the plead-
ings, depositions, admissions and affidavits is to 
be given in favor of the one against whom the mo-
tion for summary judgment is asked. 
As this court stated in Morris vs. Farnsworth 
Motel, et al, 259 P. 2d 297, 123 Utah 289: 
"Under such circumstances, the party 
against whom the summary ~udgment. is 
granted is entitled to the benefit of haVIng 
the Court consider all of the facts presented 
and every inference fairly arising therefrom 
7 
in the light most favorable to him, which we 
do in reviewing the incident." 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT AND IN HOLDING THAT 
DEFENDANT'S PLEADINGS AND AFFIDA-
VIT DID NOT PRESENT AN ISSUE OF 
USURY FOR THE DETERMINATION OF A 
TRIER OF THE FACTS. 
The case involves a promissory note which was 
executed on the first day of August, 1957, by the 
Defendant, payable to the Plaintiffs for the amount 
of $1,050.00 principal and ten per cent interest. The 
complaint alleges that there is unpaid $344.49 and 
prays judgment for that amount, together with in-
terest from February 11, 1958, together with at-
torneys' fees. 
Another case No. 155799 involves a promissory 
note for the amount of $10,000.00 executed July 8, 
1954, by Daines Manufacturing Company, a part-
nership, D. R. Daines, R. M. Daines, and J. Nor-
man Daines, to the Plaintiffs, Frank Riggle and 
Geneva H. Riggle, his wife. 
As set forth in the affidavit of Darrel R. 
Daines, one of the Defendants, before the Plaintiffs 
loaned $10,000.00 to the Defendant, it was agreed 
by and between the parties that the Defendant 
would pay an additional $150.00 per month for a 
period of five years to the Plaintiffs as an induce-
ment for the loan, for which the note of $10,000.00 
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' was given and a contract of employment was enter-
ed into by and between the Plaintiff Frank Riggle 
and the three members of the partnership, D. R. 
Daines, R. M. Daines and J. Norman Daines (R. 
19). Said employment contract was entered into 
for the purpose of evading the usury laws, as the 
amount thus paid was not for any service to be ren-
dered by the Plaintiff (R. 20). 
The note which is the subject of the action be-
fore the Court was given in the amount of $1,050.00 
because the Defendant had failed to pay seven in-
stallments of $150.00 each on the employment con-
tract. As stated in the affidavit above mentioned 
of Darrel R. Daines: 
"The promissory note in the sum of $1,-
050.00, which is the subject of this action, was 
delivered to the Plaintiff Frank Riggle, for 
back salary under the aforementioned employ-
ment contract, which sum is included in the 
$9,612.58 above." (R. 20) 
The $9,612.58 "mentioned above" was payment 
made by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs. 
Said affidavit further states: 
"That the Plaintiff Frank Riggle has 
never performed any service for the .defen-
dant corporation, except the sharpenmg of 
saws as aforementioned (for which he was 
paid separately), and the execution of. said 
employment contract was merely a device to 
evade the usury laws of the State ?f Uta~ and 
to provide the Plaintiff Frank Riggle with a 
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greater rate of interest than legally allowed." 
(R. 20) 
After delivery of the $10,000.00 note and the 
contract of employment by Daines Manufacturing 
Company, a partnership, and the three named part-
ners, in (Case No. 155799 Salt Lake County District 
court), the said defendants incorporated the busi-
ness as Daines Manufacturing Company, and the 
Defendant Daines Manufacturing Company was 
substituted as the employer in the new contract upon 
the same terms and conditions for the purpose of 
securing the Plaintiffs' usurious interest. I 
The Defendant in this action submits that· 
if the allegations of the affidavit of Darrel R. 
Daines are true, the note of $1,050.00 sued on in 
the action before the Court is for a usurious pay· 
ment and is void and uncollectible. Thus, the truth 
or falsity of the allegations of Darrel R. Daines in 
said affidavit raise an issue which should be heard 
by the Court and a summary judgment should not be 
granted. 
There are several items of law involved in this 
matter upon which counsel will submit a few auth· 
orities. 
The original note given on July 8, 1954, would 
be governed by the law relative to usury as of that 
date, which reads: 
''All bonds, bills, notes, assurances, con· 
veyances, stock, pledges, mortgages and d~~ds 
of trust and all other contracts and securities whatso~ver, and all deposits of goods or other 
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thiJ?-gs whatsoever, whereon or whereby there 
shall be reserved or taken or secured or 
agreed to be reserved or taken or secJred 
' any greater sum or greater value for a loan 
?r for~earance of any money, goods or things 
m act10n that as above prescribed shall be 
void. Section 44-0-6, U.C.A., 1943." 
Section 15-1-6, U.C.A., 1953, has this footnote: 
"Repeal. This section (L. 1907, Ch 46. 
Sec. 5; C.L. 1907, Sec. 1241 x3; C.L. 1917, 
Sec. 3324; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 44-0-6) re-
lating to the voiding of usurious contracts 
and securities, was repealed by laws 1955 Ch. 
21, Sec. 2." 
Thus, the note given in 1954 was governed by 
the law making usurious contracts void, which was 
not repealed until 1955. 
As stated in Richardson vs. Foster, 170 P. 321 
(Wash.), a usurious obligation or loan, although 
another debtor or security is added or substituted, 
is nevertheless still usurious and does not eradicate 
the usury. 
In 55 Am. J ur. 390, Sec. 96, the rule is stated 
as follows: 
"Since the usurious character of a trans-
action is determined as of the date of its in-
ception, if a contract is usurious in its incep-
tion no subsequent transaction will cure it. Hen~e, where a usurious contract is renewed 
by the giving of a renewal of substiuted con-
tract the usury follows into and becomes a 
part 'of the latter contract, making it subject 
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to the defense of usury to the same extent as 
was the original obligation. The taint at-
taches to all consecutive obligations or secur-
ities growing out of the original usurious 
transaction, and none of the descentant obli-
gations, however remote, are free from it if 
the descent can be traced. 
"Although there is authority to the con-
trary, it is generally held that the mere fact 
that a payment is made on a note or other ob-
ligation affected with usury and a new con-
tract entered into for the balance due will not 
purge the transaction of usury unless the 
usurious feature is abandoned and the new 
obligation is for a portion of the actual debt, 
freed from all usurious considerations. Like-
wise, a change in the form of the contract or 
a division of the original obligation into sev-
eral notes or other contracts will not purge 
the transaction of usury." 
The note in the case before the Court is part of 
the original usurious contract entered into on the 
8th day of July, 1954. 
As stated in Asperitia vs. California Tr1tSf 
Company, (Calif.) 322 P. 2d 265: 
"An obligation once usurious is always 
usurious as long as its original existence con· 
tinues. 
"It is urged that payment to date .bY 
Nordin did not constitute payment by plam· 
tiffs. The court found the debt and the find· 
ing is supported. Nordin testified he loaned 
the money to plaintiff and he paid it to de· 
fendant in their behalf. The effect of the 
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transaction was payment by plaintiffs to de-
fendant. In fact, defendant in effect so con-
cedes, for he says: 'It is the general rule of 
law in the State of California that if someone 
pays the usurious interest for and on behalf 
of a borrower at the borrower's request, it 
does not change the fact that usury has been 
paid by the borrower direct. * * * 
"The original agreement was null and 
void as to the stipulation to pay interest." 
In Westman vs. Dye, (California) 4 P. 2d 134, 
Supreme Court of California, the following are sev-
eral of the headnotes: 
Headnote 4. 
"Taint of usury in original usurious 
transaction attached to all renewal notes; 
hence, all payments tainted with usury could 
be offset in action on last renewal note." 
Headnote 6. 
"Usurious character of contract is not 
determined by amount of interest borrower 
has paid, but amount of interest he has agreed 
to pay on his indebtedness." 
The affidavit of Frank Riggle supports the de-
fendant's affidavit and position that the Defen-
dant's predecessors, the Daines brothers partner-
ship, had executed a prior employment contract 
along with the $10,00.00 promissory note, a usuri-
ous transaction, as the payment receipts, shown as 
part of his affidavit, reflect that he received so 
called employment payments prior to the Defen-
dant's incorporation, and the execution of the sub-
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stituted employment agreement on July 1, 1955, as 
the payments began September 1, 1954 and continu-
ing throughout October 31, 1956. 
The note sued on and contract of employment 
was but an extension of the usurious business trans-
action entered into in 1954 in connection with the 
loan of $10,000.00. (R. 11-17, R. 18-21) 
Defendant's pleadings and affidavit put the 
question of usury in issue, and it was a complete 
defense to Plaintiffs' claim, and the motion for 
Summary Judgment should have been denied. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDG-
MENT FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES \VHERE THE 
RIGHT AND AMOUNT WAS PUT IN ISSUE 
BY THE PLEADING IN THE ABSENCE OF 
ANY EVIDENCE. 
There was no evidence, affidavits or otherwise, 
in support of the award of attorneys' fees, and it is 
elementary that the amount of attorneys' fees can 
only be determined by the trier of the facts on evi-
dence when it is put in issue. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set out herein, Appellant re· 
spectfully prays that the Court set aside the sum· 
mary judgment and remand the cause for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOFFAT, IVERSON and TAYLOR 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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